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Over the last 20 years, major innovations in the French social sciences emerged from
focusing on quality and qualification (of work, of products, of technical and management
tools, etc.). It opened new ways to conceptualize social and economic exchanges. Our jour-
nal offers a tribune for further elaboration, from different disciplinary perspectives. Chris-
tine Musselin and Catherine Paradeise present a brief review and raise three questions.
1) how are attributes of quality defined and evaluated ? 2) What types of intermediation link
supply and demand and how far do both interact; 3) How is price set in quality-based
economic exchange? Five social scientists provide personal answers to these questions.
Two are sociologists (Michel Callon, Lucien Karpik), two are economists (François Eymard-
Duvernay, Jean Gadrey), one is an historian (Alessandro Stanziani). Altogether, the file
includes six contributions:
1) The concept of quality: a brief state of the art in the French social sciences and some
questions (Christine Musselin and Catherine Paradeise);
2) Putting an end to uncertainty? (Michel Callon);
3) Qualifying goods (François Eymard-Duvernay);
4) Ten theses for a socio-economics of product quality (Jean Gadrey);
5) What is to be done with singularities? (Lucien Karpik);
6) Products, norms, and historical dynamics (Alessandro Stanziani).
The primary purpose of this debate is to stimulate constructive discussion. Other contri-
butions may be sent to the editorial board (maximum 18 000 characters, spaces included).
Adresse e-mail : c.musselin@cso.cnrs.fr (C. Musselin).
1 This debate was first published in French in Sociologie du travail, as « Dossier-Débat : La qualité », composed
of five papers published in 2002 and one in 2003: Musselin and Paradeise (2002). It has been translated by Amy
Jacobs, Callon (2002), Eymard-Duvernay (2002), Gadrey (2002), Karpik (2002), Stanziani (2003).
1. The concept of quality: a brief historical review in the French social sciences
and three questions (Christine Musselin2 and Catherine Paradeise3)
1.1. History of the concept
The notion of qualification first appeared in French sociological literature immediately
after World War II. The word was part of the ordinary jargon of management as well as
unions and State. It was meant to describe and evaluate labour. Common knowledge on the
shop floor as well as collective agreements rated jobs and blue-collar workers according to
their ‘qualification’on scales rising from ‘non-qualified’ (non skilled worker = ouvrier spe-
cialisé) to ‘qualified’ (skilled worker = ouvrier professionnel). Collective agreements defi-
ned attributes to be ranked and weighted in order to build the right fit between a job, a
worker and a salary.
Like words ending in -ion, qualification covers two different meanings, that analysis
may keep separate or may bring together: (1) the state of who or what is qualified, (2) the
process by which someone (a worker, for example) or something (a particular job, for
example) is qualified.
The first meaning opens investigation on how productive capacities are developed through
learning and socialization. Qualification stands for the set of occupational qualities incor-
porated by a person. It refers to occupational ability, identity and status. It is often used to
argue that workers have so to say a natural right to hold jobs and get salaries that fit their
capabilities. In that perspective, sociological research first used the notion of qualification
to denounce the impact of Taylorism on workers’ identities and statuses. Taylorism des-
troyed the relationship between acquired capabilities of workers and required capabilities
of the jobs, that had been built and stabilized by history or tradition, by breaking down what
used to be complete and meaningful jobs. The evocation of workers’ disqualification points
up the growing gap between incorporated qualities of workers and qualities required by the
job they held. Georges Friedman, who initiated French empirical industrial sociology after
Word War II used the term with this meaning. It started a long tradition, still echoed in
recent studies, like the ones on how expert systems confiscate workers’ know-how
(Friedman, 1955, 1961; Freyssenet, 1990).
In direct contrast, P. Naville (Naville, 1961) took up the question of qualification from a
proto-constructivist viewpoint. Qualification may be considered as a state, but not as a state
of nature: qualification is a social construct, emerging from the bargaining between
employees, employers, and possibly the state, on the required capabilities for a given job.
Theorizing qualification involves a dialectical movement between constructing a person’s
qualification (his or her acquired capabilities) and qualifying a job (the capabilities requi-
red for performing it). This tradition was reactivated in the 1970s and 1980s : in a construc-
tivist perspective on the one hand (Rolle and Tripier, 1979; Rivard et al., 1979), in a societal
approach on the other (Maurice et al., 1986). Both approaches led to define qualification
2 Co-author and correspondent for this section. Christine Musselin, Centre de Sociologie des Organisations
(CSO-FNSP-CNRS), 19 rue Amélie, 75007 Paris. musselin@cso.cnrs.fr.
3 Catherine Paradeise, Département de Sociologie–Latts, Université Marne La Vallée, Bâtiment Bois de l’Etang,
Cité Descartes, 77420 Champs sur Marne, France.
‘spaces’ and ‘movements.’ ‘Qualification space’ refers to the jurisdiction for a specific rela-
tion between acquired and required qualities; ‘qualification movement’ refers to the dyna-
mics of the boundaries and content of such spaces. Both approaches consider that social
recognition of personal qualities results from the social construction of qualification by the
bargaining between groups that promote different definition of qualities and qualification.
This type of approach helped tackling several sociological problems from the early 1980s
on: socio-occupational nomenclatures (Bourdieu and Boltanski, 1975; Boltanski, 1987;
Desrosières and Thévenot, 1996), unemployment (Salais et al., 1986; Salais, 1989), occu-
pational groups and labour markets (Paradeise, 1988a). These studies were in turn based on
various developments in the sociology of professions (Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Sarfatti-
Larson, 1977).4 All helped building what was later to be known as ‘conventionalist theory’.
It was surely not by chance that François Eymard-Duvernay, the first French economist
to transpose the idea of quality onto the study of product markets, was a labour economist
who had been involved in the rebuilding of occupational nomenclatures at the INSEE5
(Eymard-Duvernay, 1986). It has long been demonstrated (Kerr, 1954; Doeringer, Piore,
1971; White, 1981) that the balkanisation of labour markets is based on the non-
comparability of qualification of occupational spaces. Just as well, markets of goods may
be segmented by differentiating between several qualities of produces, that break the mar-
ket’s homogeneity, limit interchangeability and create economic niches. Management scien-
ces had developed this idea long before its implications were fully explored in economic
and sociological theory. Further developments of this idea suggested social interdepen-
dency between supply and demand, expressed by the notion of co-production of certain
types of goods and services by producers and users. This led to distinguish between various
types of product markets, depending upon the nature of products to be delivered and types
of exchange relation obtained between producer and clients (Favereau, 1989a and 1989b;
Salais and Storper, 1997; Boltanski and Thévenot, 1987).
Curiously, it was a sociologist who first hypothesized an “economics of quality”
(Karpik, 1989, 1999). His original purpose was to renew an old question of the sociology
of professions: why do monopolistic professions (here French attorneys) remain moderate
in pricing their services, while they enjoy a strongly favourable information asymmetry
with regard to their clientele—realities that should incline them to excessive profit-takings.
The answer is found in the collective arrangements that warrant the client against abuses
related to information asymmetry in economic exchange. Although informally, pricing is
considered as submitted to collective arrangement. This approach opens up a much more
realistic and diversified approach to concrete economic life, where standardized goods pro-
duction and marketing appear just as one type of economic exchange. Such theory is highly
needed in advanced countries, where anonymous exchange of standardized goods appears
to decrease to the benefit of co-production of dedicated produces, which qualities cannot be
defined outside of the relation between producers and clients.
In the 1990s this view worked to blur the borders between sociology and economics by
linking together the collective arrangements and social mechanisms of production, inter-
4 It should be noted that in both practice and theory the problem of occupational qualification intersects that of
legal qualification of certified acts performed by professionals. Jurists as well as sociologists and economists
logically participate in discussion and debate on qualification.
5 Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.
mediation, and exchange which standard economics had worked so hard to dissociate (Hat-
chuel, 1995). The approach also opened the way for exploration of intermediation func-
tions as such (Cochoy and Dubuisson, 2000). It likewise provided a theoretical link between
qualification and socio-technical networks (Callon, 1989; Callon et al., 2001). Sociological
study of industrial certification was also fuelled by this approach (Cochoy et al., 1998;
Neuville, 1997; Segrestin, 1997). It was highly stimulating for analysis of services and
exchange of non-material produces (Gadrey, 1992, 1996), as well as of labour markets
(Musselin, 1996; Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal, 1997). Interest in quality, qualities, qua-
lification, and qualifications went hand in hand with efforts in the fields of ‘economics of
conventions’ and ‘sociology of socio-technical networks’ to establish contextualised defi-
nitions of goods and products that specify characteristics of exchange and its regulation by
the way products, producers and clients are related.
1.2. Questions
The approach in terms of quality brings to the fore a swarm of correspondences between
many questions of sociology and economics. However, it can hardly be called a unified
approach, one that enables researchers to advance together into unexplored territory. Behind
the decidedly shared interests reflected in the similar vocabulary and attention to similar
phenomena, there are differences to be explored and open questions. What are those diffe-
rences, and how should they in turn be approached? These questions invite reactions by our
five authors.
1.2.1. Uncertainty and qualities
Above and beyond correspondences, none of the studies briefly outlined above deals
with the process of identification of qualities and that of their evaluation, processes which
work together to facilitate mastery of the uncertainty involved in determining product, ser-
vice, or personal capabilities. These studies therefore do not explore the interdependence
among these two processes.
Identification involves constructing agreements, categories, conventions that in turn may
produce contextualised definitions of a product/ service’s attributes and of a person’s capa-
bility. This process is at the heart of P. Naville’s precursory studies and later studies by
Eymard-Duvernay (1986, 1989), Boltanski and Thévenot (1987), and, more recently Cal-
lon et al. (2001). For all of them, in one way or another, exchange is founded on the
co-construction of the attributes of products/ persons. These attributes are neither unique
nor immanent but rather multiple and constructed.
This first process is nonetheless not usually sufficient. Agreement on a product’s
qualification-requalification makes it identifiable and singular but does not reduce uncer-
tainty about evaluation (through judgment) of its defining attributes. This is the function of
the second process, brought to light by L. Karpik. He has shown the determining role of
personal and impersonal trust in the establishment of judgment and engagement devices
that make exchanges possible (Karpik, 1996). In other words, the judgment constitutive of
exchange cannot be reduced to qualifying a product or a person—that is, reaching an agree-
ment on its/his/her defining characteristics.
Moreover, identification has a major effect on evaluation. In university department hiring,
candidate qualification is constructed around three families of attributes: research activi-
ties, ‘collegiality,’and teaching qualities (Musselin, 2002).6 However, it has also been obser-
ved that the more importance a department gives to the second two attributes, the greater
the uncertainty, since the available signs for evaluating candidates are fewer and more dif-
ficult to measure in a standardized way (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal, 1997). In this
case, greater use must be made of judgement and engagement devices in building final
choice.
1.2.2. Intermediation
Exchanges can not occur without qualification and judgment. Both require work. This
brings intermediaries and intermediating activity out of the shadows.
First, it brings to light the variety of market intermediaries. Historical study of the mar-
ket shows how diverse intermediaries are in time and space (Chandler, 1962; Karpik, 2000;
Cochoy, 1999). But it also brings to light a variety of collective intermediation arrange-
ments - guides, rankings, titles or brand names - used to connect supply and demand and to
understand their effects on each other. More broadly, these intermediaries allow the cons-
truction of agreements among heterogeneous actors (networks, forums). In affirming that
processes for qualifying-requalifying goods increasingly occur outside the monopoly of
economic actors in the market sphere and increasingly develop in hybrid forums, Callon et
al. (2001) underscore a phenomenon that political scientists have also observed for public
goods, in works on policy networks (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Heclo, 1978),7 in the notion
of forum as developed by Jobert (1995) and that of governance (Le Galès, 1995), and in the
analysis of trends in local public management (Lorrain, 1993; Duran and Thoenig, 1996).
Intermediation slips the grip of experts, who used to be perceived as the only legitimate
intermediaries, the only legitimate intermediation producers.
1.2.3. Quality and price
Theorizing quality aims at filling some blanks of standard economic theory. It suggests
that the match between supply and demand only rarely occurs spontaneously. Matching
supply and demand requires collective arrangements and set-ups that build agreement on
the attributes of products or services. But this theorization also maintains that exchange
runs on quality (or qualification) rather than price. It therefore precludes any simple model
for determining prices and interpreting price variation. The question of how prices are set
must then be asked with greater acuity. How is value determined if not as the result of or as
the basis for adjustment between supply and demand? Curiously, this question is not cove-
red by most of the works mentioned. Moreover, contrary to what might have been expec-
ted, it is not raised by economists. Only Karpik (1989, 1999) addresses it directly, looking
at how defence attorneys’ fees are set after client and professional have met. Karpik uses
Akerlof (1970) and economic theories for which uncertainty about quality is a problem of
information asymmetry impacting on price setting.8 He identifies the mechanisms and arran-
gements that prevent defence attorneys from abusing their power over laypeople and pre-
6 These in turn can be broken down into more specific attributes, which we will here spare the reader.
7 This question is also related to the general question of how agreements are constructed among heterogeneous
actors. This was already the core of studies on shared regulating of labor relations (Reynaud, 1989, 1995).
8 L. Karpik’s demonstration is supported by Akerlof’s renowned article on the used car market (Akerlof, 1970).
clude the practice of charging high fees for mediocre service. But can the ‘economics of
moderation’ he brings to light be generalized above and beyond the law profession? Can
we conclude, as Karpik’s work suggests, that price setting (wages) is not entirely depen-
dent on qualification-requalification of goods (products, persons, services), that it is gover-
ned by other mechanisms and arrangements, such as professional practices and controls?
Or must the price (wages)-quality connection be entirely rethought, the first now conceived
as an attribute of goods quality (of products, of persons)?
2. Let’s Put an End on Uncertainties9 (Michel Callon10)
As C. Musselin and C. Paradeise rightly point out, the notion of quality has become
omnipresent in the literature –in economics as well as in economic sociology. But its repea-
ted and multiple uses in very diverse approaches and investigations show that it is still a
under-conceptualised and fragile notion. I hence tackle here successively the two questions
that the editors asked the contributors of this volume to discuss, in the hope of providing
some clarification on these issues. But, although the topic of price fixing is key in this
debate, it is too complex to be fully discussed in such a brief note, and I can just shed here
a few thoughts and observations.11
2.1. Uncertainties and quality/ies
At least two intellectual traditions, which analyse in a very opposite way how people
handle uncertainty, use the notion of quality.
The first tradition, which starts with Ackerlof’s (1970) path breaking study, followed by
Stiglitz’ (1987) one, has produced by far the greatest number of contributions. In this tra-
dition, authors relate the notion of quality to the existence of uncertainties on the quality of
goods. The existence of such uncertainties challenges the basic assumptions of market
competition. These uncertainties perturb the adjustment of supply and demand through
price mechanisms. Hence, market mechanisms cannot lead to an optimal allocation of such
goods. Authors hence make an implicit or explicit opposition between markets in which an
agreement on goods and their characterization exists among exchange participants, and the
markets in which such agreement is absent. In the latter case, the market runs into serious
problems, since the very existence of coordination is challenged when no agreement can be
found. L. Karpik’s analytic framework is close to this perspective: he shows how exchange
participants mobilize personal networks and trust in order to reduce the uncertainty on the
quality of goods (Karpik, 1989; DiMaggio and Louch, 1998). This notion of quality is also
central in the “economics of conventions,” which considerably extend the understanding of
9 This second section benefitted from a co-translation from Amy Jacobs and Grégoire Mallard.
10 Author and correspondent for this section. Michel Callon, Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation, Ecole des Mines
de Paris, 60 boulevard Saint-Michel, 75006 Paris. callon@paris.ensmp.fr ; I thank J. Gadrey and Christine Mus-
selin for their comments on an earlier version of this text.
11 I encourage readers interested in this issue to consider a paper by F. Muniesa and I, (Callon, Muniesa, 2003).
In this paper, we develop an analysis of concrete markets as collective organized devices, whose function is to
create compromises and agreements on the quality of goods and on price fixing mechanisms.
uncertainties. Authors indeed show that it is not only the quality of goods that is object of
uncertainties (agents could reduce the uncertainty on the quality of goods if they could
collect perfect information and if they could anticipate ex-ante the variation of prices), but
uncertainties also originate from a lack of shared cognitive frames, which make it possible
to get beyond singular and irreducible vantage points (Thévenot, 1989) that can threaten
the feasibility of transactions.
In the second tradition, authors refer to the notions of quality and qualification without
relating them to the notion of uncertainty. Although it is always arbitrary to identify a
founding father for any tradition, E. H. Chamberlin’s work on monopoly competition
(Chamberlin, 1953; original published in 1933) might serve as the first touchstone of this
second tradition. As F. Eymard-Duvernay notices (Eymard-Duvernay, 1989), Chamberlin
develops the idea that all market transactions necessitate that exchanged good undergo a
process of individualization.12 When describing this process, Chamberlin uses the concepts
of good and quality without distinction: the good to be exchanged is individualized in such
a way that its quality is adjusted to fit its potential buyer. Chamberlin gives no general
definition of what constitutes this quality. He relates both processes of qualification and
singularisation to the specific context of exchange. To give an example, the process of
individualisation might be acted upon by patents, brand names, special packaging or contai-
ners, style, colour, the convenience of the seller’s location, his business practices, reputa-
tion for honesty, courtesy, efficiency, as well as “all the personal ties connecting client to
seller and seller’s employees.” (p. 61) Chamberlin adds that: “to the extent that these fac-
tors and others vary ... the product varies, because those things may be of varying impor-
tance to buyers, who are actually buying them along with the merchandise itself.” In this
sense, market transactions require the individualization of goods, as such a process cons-
titutes precisely the nature of the transaction.
From this assumption derives the idea that monopoly precedes competition. Following
this idea, one has to describe each concrete market as a set of multiple singular monopolies,
which all tie a seller to a client –or to a category of individualized clients.13 Under these
conditions, there is no reason to distinguish between markets characterized by uncertain-
ties, and the ones without uncertainties: indeed, all markets are constituted of exchanged
individualized goods, whose quality is hence not uncertain. Only the process of individua-
lisation counts in the making of markets and transactions. F. Braudel reaches the same
conclusion when he explains that the capitalist market emerged in its opposition with the
principle of competition (Braudel, 1973).
This approach also intersects with the economic anthropology of transactions. In this
perspective, transactions are described as follows: a buyer pays to become the owner of a
good whose properties have been adjusted to his or her world, and which has thus been
transformed into his or her own good. This anthropological tradition centres on the notions
of attachments, ties and entanglements (Callon 1998), without referring to the notions of
utility, judgment, and preferences. Chamberlin himself emphasised the significance of the
buyer’s connectedness to the seller. This logic of attachment applies to all market transac-
12 Eymard-Duvernay speaks of singularization, though Chamberlin did not use this word.
13 White (1981) takes this logic to its extreme with his hypothesis that the consumer is the mirror in which a firm
sees its competitors.
tions, even to transactions of mass-produced and manufactured goods (under a Ford-like
mode of regulation), or even to services in the web-economy. Even at times when the stan-
dardization of mass-production prevailed, Chamberlin thought that only individualised cars
exist and that “a car,” conceived in general terms, does not exist.
Chamberlin thus reverses the analytic status of the notions of competition and market.
To him, concrete markets do not a priori necessitate the existence of competition. Concrete
markets are just constituted by a network of ties attaching sellers to buyers.14 In other
words, the generality of the agreement over the quality of goods (and thus the existence of
some competition between sellers) does not raise the most significant theoretical issues:
instead, it is the existence of a process of individualisation of goods at work in concrete
transactions. Indeed, understanding how different networks of exchange ties come to cons-
titute concrete competitive arenas (that are usually designated by the fuzzy notion of “mar-
ket”) means to explain how individualised goods can become at least partly interchangea-
ble –which proves that individualisation can go along with the establishment of rules of
commensurability; and it does not mean to study how goods, whose qualities are uncertain,
and hence whose homogeneity is not perfect, are individualised in concrete transactions.
Indeed, what varies from one exchange situation to another, is not how uncertainty is han-
dled, but rather how the individualisation of goods is constructed, and how singular connec-
tions between seller, good, and buyer are constructed.15
C. Musselin and C. Paradeise are right to point out that the labor “market” is a privileged
site for studying such adjustments, as a recent work by F. Eymard-Duvernay and collea-
gues (Bessy et al., 2001) also shows. But markets of innovative goods offer another privi-
leged site. In this case, the qualification and re-qualification of a good, which lead to its
successful individualisation, can take very diverse forms in different settings. In some cases,
individualisation can begin as early as when the design of the good is conceived; and in
other cases, sales strategies can be privileged, as well as the mobilisation of social networks
of clients, of some sets of collective arrangements and devices, and of collective arenas
where the demand side is shaped and where the good is tested. All of these mechanisms
participate in the individualisation of goods. The detailed analysis of these diverse mecha-
nisms, and of their various configurations has not yet been largely explored, though many
authors contributed, even not explicitly to this approach (Akrich and Rabeharisoa, 1989;
Akrich, 1992; Dubuisson, 1999; Hennion and Meadel, 1989; Hennion and Dubuisson, 1995;
Karpik, 1996; Licoppe, 2001).
To sum up, we can say that both traditions are concerned with the conditions that ensure
felicitous market transactions. But in the first tradition, what might lead to the breaking
down of the transaction is the very existence of the uncertainty on the quality of goods;
whereas in the second tradition, the danger is that the individualisation of goods might not
occur. In the first tradition, competition is the key notion; whereas in the second one, the
key notion is the construction of a singular attachment between a specific agent and a
specific good.
14 Chamberlin insisted on the distinction between imperfect and monopolistic competition. The first presupposes
qualifying a market in terms of what keeps it from being perfectly competitive, while the second implies recogni-
zing monopolies as a central way of organizing markets.
15 For a detailed analysis of certain mechanisms of individualization, see Cochoy, 2002.
2.2. Intermediation
This second re-conceptualisation of the notions of qualities and qualification has the
merit to bring the goods to the forefront of the analysis, and to link the anthropology of
markets to the anthropology of goods. This constitutes a complete change of perspective.
Instead of starting the analysis with agents who calculate their utility with regard to a set of
given goods, the analysis starts with goods and follows their metamorphoses, careers, qua-
lifications and re-qualifications, from laboratories to marketing departments, to the consu-
mer. The consumer himself becomes increasingly less the endpoint of the analysis, as the
process of re-qualification of goods now more and more entails the recycling of goods,
which hence change hands many times during their social lifetimes.16 This new perspec-
tive, that we proposed to call the “economics of qualities,” brings to light precisely those
actors whom economic theory, with its catch-all categories of supply and demand, tends to
relegate to the backstage of the market.
This perspective also centres on the professional qualifiers of goods (Barrey et al., 2000).
Indeed, the individualisation of goods is conceived as the result of a process of qualifica-
tion and re-qualification, which leads us to analyse the entire set of operations (conception,
production, marketing, distribution, consumption) that are distinguished in more standard
descriptions of economic activities. Here, the contribution of the economics of innovation
and technological change is essential. Innovation is obviously an extreme form of the pro-
cess of individualisation of products. This idea takes us back as least as far as to J.A. Schum-
peter, who inspired many studies using the concept of “non-price competition,” hence
seriously questioning the standard theory of markets. Constructing a market for a new
product mobilizes a whole series of actors and collective arrangements and mechanisms
that go far beyond the ones that canonical descriptions of markets consider. Examples are
academic or semi-private research laboratories, clients and users implicated in innovation
conception, financial intermediaries (Lundvall, 1992). It even involves the intrusion of groups
that are usually exterior to the market, such as patient advocacy groups, who can demand
that their demands be taken into account and who hence can interfere with the conception
and the qualification process of goods (Rabeharisoa and Callon, 1999). This kind of socio-
economic analysis highlights the diversity of actors who participate in the process of atta-
chment between what are at first indeterminate clients, and likewise indeterminate goods.
Market transactions mobilize all these groups, which are invisible when the transaction is
made, but without whom the attachment between the buyer and the then objectified and
individualized new good could not have been tied.17
Focusing on innovation processes underlines the limits of the notion of uncertainty as it
brings out the multitude and diversity of ways in which qualification processes can be
organized. Uncertainty only exists if one accepts the classic mise-en-scène of the encounter
between a subject (the consumer) and an object (the good). The economics of innovation
16 On the productive aspect of following objects rather than people, see Appadurai (1986).
17 In his introduction to the French version of Chamberlin’s 1933 text, F. Perroux (Chamberlin, 1953; original
published in 1933) underlined the diversity of the actors whose interventions Chamberlin grouped together under
the heading “sales costs.” (For Chamberlin, sales costs include all investments necessary to individualising goods.
Perroux includes labor union negotiations, for example).
has debunked such a standard script, showing that the crowd of intermediaries who create
connection and disconnection do not follow the standard story told by this fiction. It also
emphasises the significance in the making of transactions of actors that are usually concei-
ved as external to the “market” in the standard stories.18
2.3. Quality/ies and price
Once presented, this perspective opens up the question is: what is the relationship between
qualities and price fixing? The question is extremely complex; thus I just shed some thou-
ghts on this last topic.
It seems important to me to avoid using a simplistic dichotomy between abstract mar-
kets, regulated through price adjustment (like in economic textbooks), and markets where
the coordination necessitates the process of qualification and re-qualification of goods.
This dichotomy rests on the assumption that the notion of uncertainty is key in economic
processes, an assumption that I tried to challenge. Indeed, such a dichotomous vision iso-
lates abstract markets, where goods are known without ambiguity, where individual sup-
plies and demands can be aggregated (the intersection of the two aggregated curves esta-
blishing market prices); and the other markets, where the quality of goods is uncertain, and
where coordination is at work through qualification (or the establishment of conventions on
quality) since this uncertainty means coordination cannot be left to prices. This perspective
hence isolates calculation and economic rationality on side, judgment and social mecha-
nisms on the other side.19
This dichotomy actually reinforces the vision of the market as an abstract institution,
which organises a regulated competition between economic actors. The approach that I am
suggesting liberates us from this constraint, and likewise from using the too general concept
of coordination. Instead of assuming the existence of abstract markets, I treat the existence
of the expression and aggregation of singular supplies and demands (along with their inter-
section) as an open empirical question. The famous abstract and anonymous market does
not exist. Or rather, when it does exist, it is an unexpected result. As A. Kirman has demons-
trated with regard to the fish market in Marseille, non-competitive microstructures can
produce a competitive market that strictly follows the rules of the demand side economics,
and vice-versa (Kirman, 2000).20 All the studies (including some experimental ones) of
how auctions or financial markets are organized confirm this point: the transition from
individual transactions to what can be called “the market” or the market structure is an
open question. And the answer to this question always implies developing complicated,
usually evolutionary models –even, in some cases, full-scale laboratory experiments with
real actors (Guala, 1999). We should therefore refrain ourselves entirely from speaking of
18 Studies of innovation have the advantage to raise the question of market creation and market dynamics. This is
probably why evolutionist thinking (Nelson and Winter, 1982), one of the only credible alternatives to standard
economic theory within economics, originated in this field.
19 The distance between economic calculation and social judgment is epitomized in Bourdieu’s economic socio-
logy. See among others Bourdieu, 1986.
20 Not to mention M.-F. Garcia’s excellent pioneering work (Garcia, 1986) describing all the investments neces-
sary for constructing a purely competitive market.
“a” or “the” market if we do not simultaneously explain the mechanisms by which it has
been aggregated.21
Besides, as soon as the individual transaction becomes the primary focus of attention,
and as soon as its process is explained in terms of an individualisation of the good, this
dichotomy no longer needs to be sustained. Reversing the analytic status of both notions of
competition and monopoly leads to such a huge benefit. A monopoly is readily defined
because it consists of fewer actors and goods; whereas a situation of competition never
conforms to the analysts’ models, except if they reconstruct it from the singular monopo-
lies that compose it.22
Once liberated from this false opposition, and once understood that the market is not a
frame but a result, it remains before us to analyse the construction of compromises between
conceptions and values (or in other words, between the generally antagonistic and often
vague conceptions of worth) (Stark, 2001; Thévenot, 1989; that actors sustain. And this
compromise is supposed to lead to the fixing of one or several prices. How does the process
of price fixing operate? The response to this complicated question necessitates that we look
into the conditions that make products calculable in terms of price—the enterprise that
C. Musselin and C. Paradeise propose us to lead.
Calculable products? The expression may seem odd, but the question is essential. In
order for the value of a good to be assessed, it must be possible to submit it to evaluative
procedures. Usual interpretations of this process of evaluation oscillate between two pos-
sible orientations: some authors explain it by referring to the good (to the characteristics of
the good), whereas others emphasise the social aspect the monetary evaluation (referring to
the actors’ judgment on certain goods). To briefly sketch how authors understand how
goods are classifiable, we can say that some have a realist understanding of this classifica-
tion (it is embedded in things); others have a nominalist understanding of it (the good is
defined by its position within a semiological system); and others try to combine both inter-
pretations (both thing and sign) (Slater, 2002). In all cases, goods and actors are conceived
as external to each other. The approach that I outline here seems to circumvent this tension,
which reproduces all the dualisms sociology habitually butts up against. Since a good is an
individualised product, its value corresponds to the strength of its attachment to its buyer’s
socio-technological world. No evaluation is possible without at least a somewhat success-
ful process of attachment, without a process of interpenetration. Actors cannot measure the
value of a good, cannot evaluate its qualities, and cannot engage in classification procedu-
res without going through such a process. It is through this process that they measure the
strength of their attachment (and the subsequent violence that a detachment would entail).
This attachment cannot be reduced to the characteristics of the things, nor to the evaluators’
purely symbolic system of meanings. Instead it is produced by a series of adjustments, a
process of qualification that leads to the individualisation of the good. It is possible to
21 The classic sociological solution equating the market with an institution (DiMaggio, 1994) is no more convin-
cing than postulating the existence of aggregated functions. Indeed, studies of market microstructures have shown
that no institutional framework can account for the singular transactions (Callon, Muniesa, 2003).
22 It would be unimaginable to describe ‘the Marseille fish market,’ though it is surely one of the simplest mar-
kets there is, without using complicated mathematical models that would enable us to grasp the aggregation of
supplies and demands.
describe such a process, as it consists of all the tests organized by all the actors engaged in
the process of qualification-individualisation the good, which results in this attachment.
The creation of such ties and attachments is what allows a price to be determined, whose
level will depend on the actors’ calculative equipment and on the rules that they use to
express and aggregate individual supplies and demands.23 Price calculation is not possible
without the work of attachment, which is hence constitutive of any transaction. Exeunt
utility, preferences, and judgment. No evaluation without individualisation. One cannot
actually distinguish the process of individualisation of a good, which is common to all
market situations, and the transformation of products into calculable goods. How calcula-
tions are performed is another question, which remains to be studied.
One last remark: this approach intersects with evolutionary economics on various points.
Both approaches postulate diversity and singularity, and for both of them, what must be
explained is how partial and transitory orders are constructed.
3. Qualifying goods (François Eymard-Duvernay24)
I first discuss the issues that qualification of goods (to which I contributed to in the late
1980s) raises for economic theory. Second, I present what I consider the main components
of a research program for studying the matter (thereby responding to C. Musselin and
C. Paradeise’s questions). Lastly, I situate this program in relation to network approaches.
3.1. Why a labour economist became interested in qualification of goods in the late
1980s25
One of the concerns at that time was to extend research in the labour field to economics
in general (Eymard-Duvernay, 1986, 1989). Though economists were willing to ack-
nowledge that there are ‘social components’ to labour transactions, they persisted in thin-
king that this was not relevant to general economics. This compromise, institutionalised by
the field of industrial relations, was highly unsatisfactory because it closed labour econo-
mics off in a ghetto, and used the general paradigm to reduce the field. It was therefore
necessary to work in reverse, to lay claim, like ‘mainstream’ economists, to a general
approach. This was done by showing that the critique of the dominant paradigm developing
out of observation of labour relations could be extended to product trading and even finan-
cial market transactions. Some of the most innovative studies in institutionalist economics
and economic sociology have worked in this direction (Segrestin, 1997; Cochoy et al.,
1998; Tadjeddine, 2000; Licoppe, 2001).
The main aim of the approach thus developed was to emphasize the fact that there were
multiple conceptions of product quality (and therefore of labour quality), and that this
23 For a description of these mechanisms, which leads to describe markets as organized collective devices of
price fixing, see Callon and Muniesa (Callon, Muniesa, 2003).
24 Author and correspondent for this section. François Eymard-Duvernay, Centre d’Etudes de l’Emploi, Univer-
sité de Paris-X, 200 avenue de la République, 92001 Nanterre cedex, France. eymard@u-paris10.fr.
25 Callon and his co-authors (Callon et al, 2001) propose an interesting distinction between good and product.
Here I’m using the notion of good transversally to encompass products (and services) as particular states of goods.
constituted a fundamental problem when it came to agreement. One and the same product
can give rise to different interpretations of its quality, i.e., to several qualifications, a fact
which in turn creates structural disputes about the best ways to organize economic activity.
Coordination presupposes agreement on goods quality. As suggested in the introduction to
this debate, this hypothesis goes well beyond the idea that product markets are segmented.
It involves a political conception of the fact that modern societies are run through with
recurrent disagreements due to multiple conceptions of a good. The result was a fundamen-
tal reformulation of the economic approach. Macroeconomic aggregates now appeared as
complex montages involving several quality conventions, a reality which raises its own
problems, as shown by J. Gadrey with reference to services: productivity measurement, a
procedure linked to industrial qualification of goods, cannot be applied to services (Gadrey,
1996).
In some respects, modern economic theory amply confirms how worthwhile such approa-
ches are: questions of quality—of labour as well as goods—are at the core of the new
information economy. Most market dysfunction is imputed to uncertainty about quality
and information asymmetry. But the fundamental question of plurality is completely absent
from such analysis. The reason for this is readily understood: in its attempt to come close to
positive science, modern economic theory purges its universe of all questions regarding
value. Goods quality is seen as a natural property. The fact is that the pluralism inherent in
modern societies is directly linked to a debate on values. Treating problems of rationality
and cognition only, and excluding questions linked to individual and collective objectives
of activity, makes it impossible to see the qualification operations at the centre of our
approach. Even in approaches that focus explicitly on the multiple ways coordination is
achieved (transaction cost economics), it is the market that is understood to determine the
value of goods. Presupposing a plurality of modes for valuing goods without an overar-
ching market is unthinkable in modern economic theory.
3.2. A research program for studying goods and labour qualification
It seems to me the authors contributing to this debate can agree on one thing: the funda-
mental activity of coordination is finding equivalencies (between or among persons, things,
or between persons and things). To qualify is to establish equivalencies. The notion of
‘investment in form’ (investissement de forme)’ is used to account for these operations
(Thévenot, 1985; Eymard-Duvernay, 1986). Here my program is closely related to M. Cal-
lon’s on socio-technological networking (Callon, 1991) and Boltanski and Thévenot’s “Eco-
nomies de la grandeur” model (Boltanski, Thévenot, 1991). These constructions empha-
size the role of objects as bases for determining equivalencies. In economic theory, price is
understood as a universal equivalency-determiner: all goods, the whole set of work perfor-
mances, are thus evaluated on the basis of a single-measure scale. I criticize the radical
reductiveness of this understanding. In my view, the notion of qualification is more general
than price; price is only one way of qualifying. My approach enables us to think of price
determination as only one link in a long series of equivalency determinations, one that
cannot be detached from the series by deeming that it accounts fully for or ‘sums up’ the
series as a whole. In some situations, equivalencies involve formats that are more relevant
than prices (“I’m a social science researcher” rather than “my monthly salary is 5, 300 Q”).
To answer the question raised in the introduction, qualification is not in all circumstances
preliminary to price determination. Moreover, what may be seen as the abusive extension
of the notion of price should be criticized, since it establishes an equivalency between such
disparate remunerations as honoraria for a liberal profession, salaries fixed in reference to
a collective agreement, and hourly wages in an unstable job. These ‘prices’ involve varying
determination modes that may coexist within a single occupation (Musselin, 1996). They
are based on different justification modes, of which the market is only one.
Deepening this approach involves doing precisely what the introduction authors invite
us to do: distinguishing between identification and evaluation. The cognitive dimension is
not enough to account for judgment; a political vantage point must be introduced making it
possible to select, from all possible equivalencies, those that everyone would consider legi-
timate. This is clearly the approach used in the economies of grandeur model: equivalen-
cies are debated, arguments on value and justifications are exchanged in reference to a
shared good (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991). Such argumentation is framed by generality
(or justice) constraints: the solidity of equivalencies thus constructed is due to respect for
these constraints rather than power (or interest) balances. This program posits that actors
are able of hiking up the level of generality. Like social science researchers, ‘ordinary’
actors are capable of integrating their actions into a general representation of the world so
as to argue in favour of them or justify them. This hypothesis is closely tied to the justice
constraint that circumscribes legitimate equivalencies. It is based on a method that, in the
economies of grandeur model, consists of associating types of equivalency with political
philosophies. However, academic representations are in fact subjected to a generality cons-
traint that makes it possible to select equivalencies most likely to refer to a shared world.
The methodology can take several forms: in a research with E. Marchal on modes of eva-
luating skills in hiring situations, we linked each way of interpreting skills to a social science
theory rather than a political philosophy (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal, 1997). This
approach nicely reduces the distance of the generality hike (keeping to enterprise theories,
for example, rather than theories about society at large) and better describes the area of
controversy between different theories.
The static character of analyses based on general arguments is often criticized. Action
constantly ‘overflows’ justification frames, to use M. Callon’s fitting choice of verb. This is
precisely what makes interactionist approaches to the market worthwhile (Paradeise, 1988b).
In the economies of grandeur model, interaction is of course taken into account around the
notion of test (borrowed from B. Latour). But qualification dynamics must also be exami-
ned. Innovations always involve creating new ways of qualifying, ways which necessarily
stand in contrast to established valuation principles. More generally, action can never be
reduced to general justifications, as has been shown by observers who go beyond the classic
sociology interview method and focus on actions. Given situation unpredictability, it is
often collectively advantageous to invent new forms of equivalence ‘as you go.’ We have
shown that successfully coordinating a public housing administration office and its users
requires local agents to rearrange general qualifications (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal,
1994). Observing hiring employers in action also shows that tools as rigid as psychotech-
niques can be modified locally. The result at the level of action is that the various qualifi-
cation types become much less salient. We tried to show on the basis of hiring situations
that a ‘balanced’ judgment, one involving moves back and forth from one qualification
‘register,’ level, or approach to another, were fairer than judgments that keep to a single
register (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal, 1997). This approach makes it possible to show
how rich and full the intermediary roles are: intermediaries are the actors most likely to
move around among several judgment ‘registers.’
The fact that action cannot be reduced to justification does not invalidate analyses of
general qualification. On the one hand, the point of observing action is precisely that it
brings to light this tension, tension which can only mean (unless general qualification is
understood to have no reality) that the other term is indeed being taken into account. Moreo-
ver, in the long run, extending new types of qualification means constructing normative
frameworks that give them generality. It is therefore important to observe the dynamic
between actions and justifications and not to limit analysis to one or the other term. It is
from this perspective that I shall now look at network approaches, which occupy an impor-
tant place in current social science thinking and offer innovative applications to the area of
goods qualification.
3.3. Are qualifications dissolvable in networks?
L. Karpik’s path-breaking article (Karpik, 1989) is a clear illustration of an action-
focused research program. The ‘economics of quality’ is marked by strong transaction opa-
city: Transactions occur in the absence of the type of equivalency systems that usually
inform ‘market prices.’ Karpik solves the problem by posing that actors’ judgments are
shaped by a coordination mode represented by the notion of social network. Emphasis is on
the benefits of local forms of action. The information that circulates within networks is
singular, and in contrast to standardized information, makes possible precise adjustment to
personal attributes. Callon et al., (2001) use the paradigm of socio-technological networks
in a text that rightly (to my mind) emphasizes product qualification and re-qualification
strategies as carried out by means of socio-cognitive arrangements and mechanisms. Again,
this research focuses on the local character of action, but market remains in the background
as a general evaluation device in circumstances when the production process is socially
tested with the result to qualify the good.
This kind of action analysis makes the mistake of projecting the tension between action
and justification onto the excessively flexible notion of network. The local judgment that
emerges from interpersonal relations cannot be understood without taking general qualifi-
cation into account. In defence attorneying, the area studied by Karpik, it is the professio-
nal order itself that maintains consumer trust and underpins defence attorney’s very quali-
fication as well as shared principles concerning criteria for establishing a ‘fair price.’ In his
1989 text, Karpik accorded much significance to the fact that over a long period attorneys
had constructed valuation principles different from and constituting an alternative to mar-
ket valuation principles. Likewise Musselin (1996) shows that behind the apparent opacity
of evaluation of scholarly or scientific activities, actors are actually using general judgment
criteria. The socio-cognitive arrangements and devices studied by Callon et al. (2001)
increase actors’ cognitive abilities, but it is problematic to suppose that one can move unin-
terruptedly from cognitive to valuation (qualification) operations. These authors insist on
the reflexive aspect of qualification processes; however, what their analysis shows are the
obscure mechanisms of consumer attachment and detachment, mechanisms that are ‘embed-
ded’in the socio-cognitive environment shaped by business. We are told that ‘hybrid forums’
provide the basis for public debate on goods qualification. But how are these forums related
to the cognitive processes analysed? When we observe how qualification professionals
guide consumers’ perceptions by modifying their cognitive environment (a particularly
remarkable example is playing with colours in such a way as to attract children’s eyes and
thereby shake up consumer’s routinised values), it is very unclear how and where public
debate could come into play. The authors do not mention asymmetries between companies,
which control socio-cognitive arrangements, and collective arrangements and consumers,
and they describe ‘service providers’ and ‘beneficiaries’ as if they were immersed in a
universe where cognition was equally distributed and emotions shared. How can such ana-
lytic tools lead to a political, critical approach to the market? That the authors accept the
market as the category encompassing all exchange makes it all the more difficult for them
to take a critical view. They seem not at all to imagine that the ‘market’ form could be
contested or called into question by other general modes of coordination for goods quali-
fication.
What is ultimately at issue in these scientific debates is the question of whether a given
market is democratic. How could the subjects of criminal investigations studied by Karpik
find their way in a totally opaque defence-attorney ‘market’? How could M. Callon et al.’s
consumers find their way in a modern economy marked by plural conceptions of what a
good is, by accelerating product re-qualification processes, and by corporate power?
The alliance between institutionalist economists and sociologists of the market, suppor-
ted by current developments in the social sciences, should make it possible to put atempo-
ral, universalistic conceptions of the market as a far-off, untouchable valuation operator
definitively behind us. Actors spend time locally and in public forums qualifiying and requa-
lifying goods (and work) and constantly debating valuation principles. The all-cognitive
approach threatening the social sciences at present is incapable of giving more depth to the
political dimension of valuation processes. What principles of goods quality does a society
want to support? With what types of coordination arrangements? Business companies pro-
duce abundant responses to these questions—and act on them. But we have to be sure that
the devices and arrangements they set up and use correspond to a democratic conception of
society. The recent development of research in this area makes it possible to look into the
different forums for debate on goods quality and examine them critically. Such research is
in tune with the current period, favorable to reinforcing arrangements and devices for qua-
lifying goods and to integrating environmental, developmental, and social questions and
preoccupations. The connection being made between product qualifying and work quali-
fying in terms of social concerns is particularly promising.
4. Ten theses for a socio-economics of product quality (Jean Gadrey26)
Contrary to the other contributors, I have never written specifically on quality, and in
this short text my perspective is that of a user and adapter of others’ concepts. The ten
26 Author of and correspondent for this section. Jean Gadrey, CLERSE, Faculté des Sciences Economiques
et Sociales, University de Lille 1, 59655 Villeneuve-d’Ascq cedex, France. jean.gadrey@univ-lille1.fr.
theses here presented correspond to my current way of understanding the issue. In the
space available, however, I have not been able to support them by means of my recent field
works.27
These theses concern the quality of various products, often, though not exclusively, ser-
vices. Except in the last thesis, I do not distinguish between goods and products, despite M.
Callon, C. Meadel, and V. Rabeharisoa’s stimulating suggestion (Callon et al. 2001). Except
incidentally, my analysis does not pertain to qualifying persons.
4.1. The context: producing and managing uncertainty in the post-Fordist period
Thesis 1: The question of uncertainty about product quality is one of the most serious
problems for conventional economics today (by conventional I mean standard or extended-
standard economics as conceived by Favereau, 1989a). This is not the only problem that
faces this paradigm, but it is one of the most critical for its relevance, because the conven-
tional theory cannot allow for the idea that protagonists could be radically uncertain about
the very object of trade. Such uncertainty is not intrinsic (tied to the ‘nature’ of the
object), but socially constructed by actors, who both produce uncertain situations and
seek to manage uncertainty as well as possible, often with unequal management abilities
and powers. In France the first studies by economists emphasizing these questions date
from the early 1980s and a research program into ‘how forms are invested,’ associated with
the names of F. Eymard-Duvernay and L. Thévenot, among others. In 1986, Eymard-
Duvernay (Eymard-Duvernay, 1986) published a paper called ‘La qualification des pro-
duits,’ and in 1989 Thévenot (Thévenot, 1989) produced remarkable analyses of ‘critical
uncertainty ... regarding goods definition.’
During what is known as the Fordist period, critical uncertainty was not highly visible.
The quality of highly standardized, mass-produced goods was not continually disturbed by
innovation, but rather marked by stable cognitive points of reference regarding traded pro-
ducts, relative scarcity of product ‘re-qualification’ situations, and consumer ‘detachment’
(Callon et al., 2001).
Neo-Fordism also fits this framework, considering increasingly diversified goods are
aimed at increasingly segmented markets. The list of goods is longer, but they remains
largely standardized and can therefore be qualified by previous methods. Quality regula-
tion can still be based on collective arrangements and devices for reducing informational
asymmetry concerning quality characteristics can be understood as technological perfor-
mance characteristics. However, the accelerating pace of innovations that lead to radical
re-qualifications of products weakens this framework.
The relevance of this framework only became truly problematic with the sharp progres-
sion of ‘singular goods’markets, and more generally with trade involving ‘uncertain objects’
(‘uncertain’ in protagonists’ eyes). Such uncertainty can come from a good’s singularity
(no prior experience of it), the fact of continual innovation (which produces the same kind
27 My current fields of research (in France) are retail sales, the hotel and restaurant businesses, banks and insu-
rance companies, business consulting firms, family allowance welfare offices, La Poste, hospitals. International
comparisons have been done in several cases, in collaboration with French and non-French researchers.
of uncertainty), or other factors, such as ambiguous and ambivalent user expectations and
producer goals and commitments (example: is the result of a service provision an ‘output’
or as an ‘outcome’?), the existence of several time spans for judging results (e.g. in educa-
tion, health, consulting, and insurance), or the joint presence of several conflicting or incom-
mensurate evaluation registers or criteria, this being the source of ‘critical uncertainties’
(Thévenot, 1989; Gadrey, 1996). In these conditions, unless appropriate collective arran-
gements and devices are in place, the instability of cognitive references for products starts
to spread, together with distrust or suspicion regarding the properties said to make traded
objects useful. This situation is linked in part to the powerful, ongoing advance of service
activities,28 more precisely those services most distant from Fordist industrial standardiza-
tion logic: relational and professional services (namely health, education, culture, tourism,
social services, business and personal services). In the last quarter century, these services
have seen the strongest growth, whatever the measuring criteria used (production, job crea-
tion by industry or by occupation, consumption, etc.).
According to Karpik (1989, 1996, 1999, 2000), these types of economic production and
exchange partake of a world that is radically different from the production and market
world of standard theory. This world can be analytically defined as is the ‘economics of
quality.’ Here the mechanism for coordinating or adjusting producers and clients is not the
‘price-market’ but the ‘judgment-market.’29 Judgment regarding quality is based primarily
on personal networks and trust or confidence (personal or impersonal). Price determination
also largely depends on personal networks and professional norms.
Theses 2 to 6 answer C. Musselin and C. Paradeise’s questions regarding the scope of
this model.
4.2. Five theses on the economics of quality
Thesis 2. The approach to qualification processes operative in the theoretical model of
the economics of quality and corresponding judgment market is very useful, as are the
modes therein referred to for adjusting protagonists to one another (norms, networks, per-
sonal and impersonal trust and confidence-generating arrangements and mechanisms).30
Karpik (1989) mentions its possible use in analysing financial intermediation, insurance
and tourism activities, as well as for certain durable goods. But I think its validity extends
far beyond these examples, namely to the vast area of relational and professional services.
This does not mean that the types of ‘production networks’ and ‘trade networks’ (in Kar-
pik’s terms) characteristic of defence attorneys exist everywhere. In each case it is neces-
sary to identify the norms, networks, judgment modes and trust-building arrangements that
make the market work.
28 This thesis—‘service activity as the basis for the economics of qualities’—is also supported by Callon and his
co-authors (Callon et al., 2001).
29 On the relation between uncertainty and judgment, and on F. Knight’s crucial contribution to this research
problem, see also Rivaud-Danset, 1998.
30 See Karpik, 1996.
Thesis 3. The defence-attorney market model (together with its French ethics of mode-
ration) is obviously a highly particular one in the matter of price determination, as
Karpik is the first to say. It is likely that all quality markets are more or less specific in this
sense. On management consulting markets, for example, behaviours pertaining to an ‘eco-
nomics of immoderation’ may be sometimes observed. Jacques De Bandt (1994, p. 220)
cites prices ranging from x to 40x for services ‘defined similarly ... on the basis of what are
in principle very precise contract obligations.’ Musselin (1996) has shown that the mode of
price determination in university hiring markets—judgment markets, it should be
remembered—is very different from the one for defence attorneys.
Thesis 4. It is advisable to analytically dissociate the analysis of adjustments concer-
ning quality from that of price adjustments. Price is not a component of product quality,
nor of the quality of persons who are hired. Price can and often does function as a signal of
quality, among other signals. Even more often, in social exchanges within the economics of
quality, adjustments concerning quality are intertwined with price adjustments, namely
through quality/price arbitration. But such arbitration is not between various attributes of
quality of which price would be understood as one, but rather linked to economic cons-
traints and certain actors’ willingness to pay for certain qualities.
Thesis 5. The blindspot in current socio-economics research into quality is its failure
to take into account production costs as they concern quality and production actors’
strategies around the quality/cost balance. Quality adjustments and price adjustments always
occur against a backdrop of structures, constraints and cost-related choices.
Products in the judgment market, for example, are also subject to constraints and cost-
related choices associated with experimental assessing of clients’ willingness to pay for
high quality, which is never infinite. Even in situations where it would seem that clients are
ready to ‘pay any price’ to obtain an extremely high level of quality, we know full well that
this is a false impression. However, analysis of quality costs on the judgment market indi-
cate that they, like quality itself, are difficult to calculate and predict. They tend to be assessed
for major product families, as averages and orders of grandeur, with significant differences
occurring within a single family.
Thesis 6. The validity of the economics of quality extends beyond the competitive
market sector. Similar questions (judgments on the quality of uncertain products) are raised
in the case of public monopolies operating in the market sector. Indeed, these questions are
the point of departure for Hirschman (1970). Furthermore, singular services exist within
the non-market sector (public education, public health, etc.) and some public administra-
tions, which are marked by uncertainty, judgments on quality and quality/cost arbitration.
In general, socio-economics of quality should be distinguished from socio-economics of
competition, though the connections between them are often very strong.
4.3. Operational frameworks for a socio-economics of quality: four theses
The first thesis is a response to Musselin and Paradeise’s major question about the dis-
tinction between processes of identification and evaluation, though I proceed on the basis
of slightly different categories.
Thesis 7: Abstractly, with the goal of developing socio-economic approaches to pro-
duct quality, real processes involve three generally intertwined problems:
• The inscription of the cognitive and semantic content of descriptions of quality in
grammars or ‘registers,’ in various more or less formalized types: criteria, characteris-
tics, quantifiable and non-quantifiable attributes, more or less elaborate literary (not to
say qualitative) descriptions, reference values or ‘grandeurs,’ justice principles constitu-
ting more or less widespread or ‘incorporated’ knowledge. This cognitive (and political)
content can be extracted from discourses, various documents, charters, verbal interac-
tions. According to Boltanski and Thévenot, it could be analysed in terms of a limited
number of value systems, paradigms, or conventions (see Thesis 8).
• The social mechanisms and processes of adjustment, coordination, and more or less
conflictual validation of both the aforementioned conventions or values (the search for
an agreement on general principles) and product quality as assessed by conventions
(application of such principles). While the first problem is static (the goal is to identify
‘grandeurs’ within a given situation), this one is ‘dynamic’ and historical. It can also be
said that quality norms and conventions represent resources for action. They are mobi-
lized in actions and networks the dynamics of which can in turn lead to rehauling the
initial framework. Analysis of the role of ‘intermediaries’ and ‘prescribers’ is relevant
here. This has been explored primarily by sociologists, but contributions have also come
from the French school of the economics of conventions.
• The rationalization of quality, the representations and actions by means of which
producers (at times together with users) organize economically effıcient quality produc-
tion as regard to quality norms and conventions temporarily stabilized (problems 1 and
2). Obviously the diverse visions and rationalization modes can refer back to the diver-
sity of quality conventions (problem 1) and result from social processes analysed in
terms of problem 2. But this third problem is also distinct from the other two in that it is
more concerned than the others with intellectual and organizational processes that ‘pro-
duce’ quality products which nonetheless obey economic constraints and not, as in pro-
blem 2, processes for validating products independently of this constraint (see
Thesis 9).
Thesis 8 (referring to problem 1). Among the available theoretical references, the most
effective frameworks for examining the diverse ‘registers’ used with regard to determi-
ning product quality are to be found in the existing program of research on economics of
conventions, particularly the work of Eymard-Duvernay (1986, 1989, 1994), Thévenot
(1986, 1989), Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) and Salais and Storper (1997). While not
identical, all these frameworks are based on the hypothesis that plural, heterogeneous qua-
lity conventions exist. If they are to be used effectively for multifaceted evaluation of qua-
lity or sociological analysis of quality evaluation situations, they must be adapted and rein-
terpreted according to the issues and conflicts present in each field. This approach excludes
the idea of folding everything down to a single synthetic dimension (price being the can-
didate usually chosen to effect the homogeneisation).
Thesis 9 (re studies problem 3). Rationalization of product quality as representation
and as action takes two polar-opposite forms that are generally mixed together in real
processes: industrial and professional rationalization. This distinction, which hearkens
back to my previous analysis of service modernization (Gadrey, 1994), here applies to
product quality and how it may be obtained or improved under the economic efficiency
constraint.
Industrial rationalization of quality is analytic and aims at standardization. It involves
breaking down quality into objectified ‘characteristics’ which have generally been identi-
fied previously (by means of surveys, complaint handling, etc.). It adds up or subtracts
quality characteristics, or combines them differently. It also purports to calculate the exact
economic costs of quality (with industrial management control methods), classify products
of different quality in lists with clearly marked borders (product ranges), and carry out
certified tests and measures of various characteristics. Callon et al. (2001) have shown that,
whereas there are in fact complex social adjustments around such qualification processes,
to agents of industrial quality rationalization, quality appears as a set of characteristics
intrinsic to the product, characteristics which must then be ‘sold’ to consumers through
information dissemination and mise-en-scène.
The professional rationalization of quality also has to describe potential or effective
aspects of product and often service quality (in order to act on them), but those aspects are
not characteristics in the previous sense, which is also the meaning the term has in econo-
mic theory based on K. J. Lancaster’s work. I’m referring to intellectual problem resolution
methods (with possible recourse to technology) and professional routines or ‘recipes’ that
are partially singular and partially common throughout a given profession and in any case
open to situation specificity. Product diversity is conceived in terms of types or families of
cases, but diversity subsists within each family. Qualification of services can refer to certi-
fied or reputed intellectual skills or aesthetic, affective, ethical, creative, etc. skills, which
can in some cases be interpreted with the help of Boltanski and Thévenot’s concept of
‘worlds’ (Boltanski, Thévenot, 1991). Some of the aspects present in hiring operations as
analysed by Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal (1997) may also be found there. A client’s
hiring of a professional service provider is indeed similar in certain respects to a com-
pany’s hiring of an executive, both in terms of uncertainty about the result, importance
attached to quality, and the fact that it is impossible to break skills down into calculable
characteristics.
As it stands, this thesis establishes too strong an opposition between two types of logic
that the same persons may in fact use simultaneously to rationalize the quality of the same
products. The reason for this is simple: certain quality attributes of a great number of pro-
ducts, particularly service products, can be described by means of calculable characteris-
tics; others on the basis of judgments not governed by calculation or technical norms but no
less rational (argued, referring to principles and values assumed to be shared, etc.). This
observed situation is not due to such products’ intrinsic properties, but to the current state
of quality evaluation conventions, as if confidence needed simultaneously to be based on
calculation and analysis of product quality and more synthetic representations or represen-
tations calling upon non-calculable scales of grandeur. In situations where conceptions of
rationalization and rationalizing actions are mixed, collective arrangements and mecha-
nisms for managing uncertainty about quality are also mixed.
Thesis 10. Goods markets, markets of individuals, organization markets. When restric-
ted to the most common situation in production and trade, adjustments involving product
quality and price do not always focus on the commodity as such (Callon et al., 2001).
Cognitive touchstones, references, sources of buyer confidence and loyalty, and producers’
selling arguments can concern the good being sold, the individual producer or provider
(personal trust), or the producing organization (reputation). In reality, these references are
often combined, but in certain cases one or the other dominates. These distinct cases can be
qualified as goods markets, markets of individuals, and organization markets,31 with the
understanding that real trade always concerns the product, but that each of the three market
types designates the entity that polarises judgments on quality relying on confidence-
generating arrangements and devices. Clearly the last two types of market display the condi-
tions most favorable to the functioning of a judgment market, even though that market can
also be relevant in certain goods markets.
5. What is to be done with singularities? (Lucien Karpik32)
The “economics of quality” deals with commodities (goods and services) that are usually
considered as differentiated products and yet differ from them by three combined charac-
teristics : multiple qualities, uncertainty of quality, and primacy of quality. As a result of
multidimensionality, these products are at least partially incommensurate with each other;
quality uncertainty prevents the possibility of distinguishing good from bad quality and,
linked to information asymmetry, it drives toward market failure, as Akerlof’s model shows.
Lastly, with primacy of quality, quality competition wins out over price competition.
Obviously the separation between the two categories of differentiated products and “ qua-
lity products ” (or “ singular products ” or “ singularities ”, three notions I used interchan-
geably) involves interpretations that cannot be assumed to converge, not only because rea-
lity is ambiguous, but also because social actors may have different evaluation criteria.
Though the “market of singularities ” is outside the relevant domain to which neoclas-
sical theory applies, it can still be analyzed. Here, due to the lack of space, the analysis is
devoted to the final phase in the economic co-ordination. I shall only allude to prior stages
and mid and long-term transformations. This perspective is neither exclusively sociologi-
cal or economic, but a particular combination of the two. The critical examination of the
so-called universal validity of neoclassical theory, as well as of the work of Karl Polanyi, is
the chosen way to identify the “market of singularities”, a peculiar form of economic
co-ordination that had not been perceived yet, and which justifies a theoretical construction
making that particular reality not only intelligible but socially visible.
5.1. The limits and limitations of neoclassical theory
Neoclassical market theory amounts to price theory. The assumption of universality means
not only that it proposes general laws but also that every reality involving exchange, howe-
ver ‘impure’ and ‘imperfect’ it may be, can always be linked to the same theoretical fra-
mework. This universality owes much to the “Chamberlin Revolution”, whereby differen-
tiated products could be added to homogeneous ones without modifying the analytic
apparatus (Chamberlin, 1953; original 1933).
Market theory remains price theory when a differentiated good is understood as a homo-
geneous good related to a specific market (with as many markets as differentiated goods),
31 See Favereau, 1989a and Eymard-Duvernay, 1994.
32 Author and correspondent for this section. Lucien Karpik, Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation, Ecoles
des Mines, 60 boulevard Saint-Michel, 75006 Paris. karpik@paris.ensmp.fr.
when close markets are linked together by substitution prices and the specific effects of
product variety on prices have been identified. Universality is still postulated even though
mainstream theory leaves out (unless by the use of reductionist practices), multidimensional
and quality uncertainty products whose prices cannot be set by the usual economic tools.
Of the many works in the last twenty or thirty years that seek to push back these limits,
Lancaster’s theory is unique because it directly tackles the problem of reconciling multi-
dimensional products and price theory. Each product is thus considered as a “bundle of
characteristics” : characteristics are incorporated in good and value depends on the corres-
ponding satisfied utilities (Lancaster, 1966). The circle seemed successfully squared.
Despite its ingenuity, Lancaster’s theory elicits three criticisms, which I shall state but
not develop. First, the notion of a “bundle of characteristics” transforms configurations of
interdependent characteristics into sums of weighted independent characteristics. Second,
the choice of the relevant characteristics of the multidimensional commodity is not at all
clear: ordinary experience shows that it always divides social actors. Third, there is no
reason to believe that the value of a characteristic, measured by the degree of satisfied
utility, would be the same for every consumer, especially when we know full well that
utility and preferences are varied and variable.
For these three reasons -- and the first one alone is sufficient --Lancaster’s theory seems
unacceptable. The analysis of “singularity” exchanges remains an unsolved problem. In
fact, neoclassical economics fails to grasp the form of a market that its analytic tools pro-
hibit it from observing and explaining.
5.2. The legacy of Karl Polanyi
Polanyi’s contribution is twofold : it concerns forms of economic co-ordination and
forms of market embeddedness. On the basis of historical and ethnographic studies, Pola-
nyi identified three types of trade whose relevance seem truly general: reciprocity, redistri-
bution, and exchange. The last one encompasses the “ self-regulating market ” (Polanyi,
1957). His theory is both essential and ambiguous: essential in that it makes it possible to
question the universal validity of neoclassical theory; ambiguous because the author draws
a line between, on the one hand, the “ self-regulating market ”, developed countries, and
neoclassical economics and, on the other, “embedded markets”, traditional societies, and
traditional types of markets. The theory thus determines the conditions for its own success
and failure: while standard theory becomes a regional science, K. Polanyi has no analytic
tools for identifying and explaining the possible pluralism of forms of exchange within
developed countries. After Polanyi, the issue could at last be formulated.
In The Great Transformation (Polanyi, 1944), Polanyi explained the economic and poli-
tical catastrophes that punctuated European history from 1914 to 1945 by the development
of a “self-regulating market” ruled exclusively by price and internal forces. But to avoid
any misunderstanding, he explicitly affirmed that “a market economy separate from the
political sphere is impossible”. He supported this claim by means of detailed analyses
showing that the free market could not have arisen and developed without systematic, conti-
nuous state intervention.
Shall one define the “self-regulating market ” by the emancipation from society, or rather
from state and administrative intervention ? Polanyi refused this alternative. He believed
instead that the modern market can only appear as non-embedded (self-regulated) because
it is embedded. The difference between traditional and modern markets lies not in the
embedded/disembedded alternative, but rather in different forms of embeddedness. Whe-
reas traditional markets come equipped with social structures (kinship, religion, culture),
modern markets are equipped with a state-administrative apparatus whose intervention to
obtain obedience to the law and disseminate diversified knowledge is indispensable if the
market is to appear self-regulating. Polanyi’s theory thus provided two major advances:
plural forms of exchange and plural forms of embeddedness.
5.3. Products, actors, and forms of market embeddedness
The analytic principle linking forms of co-ordination to categories of commodities is
operative in several analyses. Eymard-Duvernay (1989) relates three forms of economic
coordination to three ‘quality conventions’; Salais and Storper (1997) present four catego-
ries of economic coordination, associated with four categories of traded products, while I
establish correspondences between two forms of market and respectively
homogeneous/differentiated products and quality products (Karpik, 1989). This shared pre-
mise does not prevent different perspectives.
In the “economics of quality” products in the market competition are fashioned by both
innovation and marketing, and more generally by the knowledge of market specialists
(Cochoy, 2002; Barrey et al. 2000) in order to display desirable qualities to the customers.
However, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the collective development of “singula-
rities ” does not prevent the autonomous intervention by collective devices and the inde-
pendent transformations of consumers, both of which are changed in turn through proces-
ses that both integrate the market and extend beyond it (Paradeise, 1988b).
From this perspective, the contents of the market embeddedness form depend on the
specific constraints that quality products impose on exchange actors. Once the primacy
assigned to qualities has pushed price into the background, two problems become central.
The first is, in order to reduce and even to eliminate market opacity on multidimensional
products, to construct and disseminate complex information based on the ever-problematic
choice of relevant product dimensions. Moreover as consumer choice is based on judgment
rather than calculation, this complex information should respect the rules governing
judgment-shaping. This difficulty is particularly acute given how fast “singularities” are
renewed. The second problem is that quality uncertainty requires setting up mechanisms to
guarantee the promise associated with the purchase. These constraints have to be at least
partially met for the market to be able to function. This job is handled by devices and
market actors.
Quality market “equipment” is made up of external arrangements that encompass both
judgment devices and promise devices. The first ones include networks, labels, rankings,
guides, reputations, brands, professional groups etc., and their job is to produce knowledge
adequate to the consumer judgment. The second ones make trade predictable by neutrali-
zing fears of opportunism through the trust ensured by judgment devices (Karpik, 1996,
2000).The two come together in the same device.
Market actors are characterized by a form of commitment that combines competence, as
specific knowledge of the products, and judgment, as a decision based on a particular confi-
guration of evaluation criteria. Devices and actors, the first ones by their modes of action
and the second by their modes of commitment, transform the product characteristics: their
interaction determines singularities’ final qualification.
The following are a few cursory illustrations of how devices/consumers transform qua-
lity products. By network: Business consultants, for example, are basing the excellence of
their services and clients‘ trust by belonging to a network composed exclusively of grandes
écoles33 graduates (Sauviat, 1994). By impersonal devices: The ‘same’ job will be more or
less ‘skilled’depending on which hiring mechanisms are used (Eymard-Duvernay and Mar-
chal, 2000). By guides : an authoritative guide can bring about the ‘overqualification’ of
some wines, while on the contrary, the box-office omnipresence will usually downgrade
the ‘films d’auteurs’. By interaction between impersonal devices, networks, and actors’
dispositions: choice of university professors is legally supposed to be based on a purely
scientific qualifications of the vacant position, implying ranking based exclusively on can-
didates’ scientific research achievements. But in most cases, networks are added to the
impersonal device that diversifies the nature of information, and as a result the redistribu-
tion of jury members’ judgments, in the form of votes, requalifies both positions and can-
didates, thus upsetting the initial distribution of hiring chances (Musselin, 1996). The exam-
ples that could be cited are various enough to preclude the setting in advance of the analytic
approach’ empirical relevance.
Far from economic naturalism, the functioning of “markets of singularities” is thus defi-
ned by the relationships between the producers and intermediaries who fashion the supply
of quality products, market devices, and forms of consumers’ commitment. All things being
equal, the variations of these components explain the variants of markets of singularities.
5.4. Price formation
When competition by qualities dominates competition by prices, price formation is only
partially the result of the supply-demand relations. What mechanisms then explain why
prices are low (but at least equal to production costs) or high ? And if price competition is
subordinated to competition by qualities, how is it nevertheless that prices seem to build a
general order ?
The lawyers’ market shows clearly the influence of lawyers’ networks which, by their
daily functioning, makes possible a system of individualized comparisons and spontaneous
fee-setting that corresponds to the self-evaluation of a personal professional status (Karpik,
1999: 163-168). The observation of a few other “markets of singularities” suggests (among
others) two main possibilities : 1) prices are set according to the position occupied by
“producers/sellers” within a more or less shared conception of the professional hierarchy;
2) prices are more or less set according to intermediaries’ dominant judgments, when their
authority, based on expertise, is recognized as such by consumers. In sum, the price order
in these two cases, and under highly variable financial constraints, expresses two versions
of the social order: professional hierarchy, and the ranking by consumers of the market
authorities.
33 Prestigious higher education and professional training institution based contrary to most French universities,
on selective admission. They are mainly oriented toward scientific and business positions.
It should not be impossible to identify a few patterns of price formation in singularities’
markets. The real difficulty, given the lack of relevant data, lies in identifying the specific or
combined effects of these social structures and supply-demand relations on prices.
5.5. Conclusion
The “economics of singularities” points out a theory that aims to make intelligible the
organization and functioning of economic coordination around singularities. The analysis
here was limited to commodities, but it could be extended to other bearers of singularity
like corporations (Favereau, 1989a). But before one should check the markets’ limits whether
the imaginary, idiosyncratic figure of Nike, for example, has really become the foundation
and the guarantee of a collective singularity that could now apply to all Nike products, even
the most ordinary ones (Klein, 2001).
This theoretical construction is not limited to the final step of the relation between sup-
ply and demand. It is also relates to the prior stages where products qualification and
re-qualification create singularities or make them disappear. More generally, it is concer-
ned with the mid- and long-term effects of singularization and de-singularization of com-
modities, the historical forms of economic co-ordination and the kind of testing such study
implies (Gadrey, 1994).
6. Products, norms, and historical dynamics (Alessandro Stanziani)
The above contributions suffer several shortcomings: they are vague about the notion of
norm and they do not pay enough attention to historical economic dynamics. While pro-
duct qualification is essential in order to speak of norms, norms can refer to both legal rules
(which should in turn be distinguished according to the institution that produced them
-parliament, government, a ministry, a law-court- by group that produces them and their
place in the legal hierarchy -law, decree, circular, etc. of legal arrangements and mecha-
nisms) and economic policy measures, as well as to conventions between private actors and
even investment strategies (production normalization). This has to be clarified to account
for current product safety problems and their historical origin. But norms are also inscribed
in the historical dynamic of the economy and help shape that dynamic. From this perspec-
tive, norm production and application are not external to economic action but are an essen-
tial component of it. All static opposition between norm and market is overcome in what I
call the economic-legal history.
6.1. Information and conventions
It is first necessary to specify the relations between product characteristics, institutions,
and the historical economic dynamics in the information economy. The solution proposed
by Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz (1987) applies in fact to a special case: information asym-
metry presupposes that contracting parties share the same notion of quality with regard to
the traded good or service. Only in this case can I affirm, for example, that the used car I
bought doesn’t correspond to the quality I was seeking and the seller claimed to be offe-
ring. The seller, meanwhile, can only hide the real characteristics of his ‘lemon’ if he knows
and shares the same notion of quality as the buyer. In other cases, there is no such shared
knowledge. The quality of meat, for example, is not always defined in the same way by
butchers, stockbreeders, and consumers, nor by various administration departments in charge
(agriculture, health, justice, and so forth). This diversity is accentuated when temporal and
spatial contexts are enlarged: the notion of ‘quality’ meat was hardly the same in the eigh-
teenth and twentieth centuries!
The economics of conventions has proposed innovative responses, but has difficulty in
positioning itself in relation to the information asymmetry theory. Some reject these answers
(as M. Callon), while others consider them it as the firm centre bulk of the economics of
quality (as L. Karpik). The problem is that conventions are treated as tools of coordination,
either alternative or complementary to others, such as prices and norms. In either case, it is
necessary to clarify not only the notion of price, as François Eymard-Duvernay in this
debate rightly observes, but also and above all the question of norm. This notion encom-
passes heterogeneous elements: legal rules, productive solutions, agents’ agreements on
product characteristics.
6.2. Coordination vs hierarchy
Why does economics of conventions have trouble grasping this aspect? The answer
probably lies in its virtually exclusive emphasis on coordination, to the detriment of hie-
rarchization (of actors, products, adjustment mechanisms or arrangements, etc.). Though
legal rules on products may be adopted through agreement within or among one or several
constituted economic interest groups, they also work against other interest groups. Euro-
pean Union norms officially define wine in a way that excludes certain practices and pro-
ducers and creates hierarchies among actors and regions. It is only at this point that conven-
tions rooted in trust can be put in place. In other words, conventions are situated in a clearly
defined institutional context that they have, of course, contributed to shape. This conclu-
sion is also valid for other aspects evoked by the economics of convention, beginning with
expertise. Without neglecting the importance of the issues and questions examined in a
far-ranging literature (Bessy and Chateaureynaud, 1995; Callon, 1998; etc.), it is regretta-
ble that on this point too, juridical rules have been neglected. Disagreements and conflicts
around types of expertise, the role of experts and their training, the impact of expertise on
public policies and action and on the media does not occur in an institutional or legal
vacuum.
Certification, labels, and AOCs (appellations d’origine contrôlée; labelling guaran-
teeing location of origin) are among the signs of quality currently in use in the European
Union. Jurists distinguish them in terms of procedure and validating institution. The label
is a sign of quality subject to the control of professional associations; it refers directly not
to goods quality, but to goods characteristics. AOCs, on the contrary, are determined on the
basis of government regulations. These, in turn, are determined on the basis of agreements
between the major relevant producer associations (Olszak, 2001). Lastly, certification has a
different definition whether considered by jurists or by economists or sociologists. Certifi-
cation is not a matter of legally imposed quality control but rather a private sector-
determined normalization (Serverin, 1985). This is based on company blueprint aiming not
at superior quality (in contrast to AOCs) but a consistent quality (Olszak, 2001, p. 166).
These three types of norms do not have the same legal status, and for this reason they do not
have the same impact on economic practices. Therefore, though one of the economic conse-
quences of these arrangements is a process of normalization and even standardization (though
this effect depends on the sector and the studied period under study), that phenomenon
should be distinguished from industrial production normalization, which has no direct source
in law or legal regulation.
6.3. Legal rules and informal agreements
At this point it is necessary to link legal rules with other norms on products. It is impor-
tant to loosen the traditional nineteenth-century opposition34 between behaviour governed
by law and behaviour involving informal agreements between or among parties. This oppo-
sition causes to loose sight of the link between the two: actors can of course make arran-
gements among themselves, but informal agreements are not independent of legal rules,
and this is so from both cognitive and instrumental viewpoints. The way labelling and
certification are conceived and implemented depends on disciplined use of the signs of
quality above them in the legal-economic hierarchy: AOCs.
This does not mean that the solution is to be found in the new standard approaches to law
and economics. In its laissez-faire variant (Coase, 1984; Posner, 1977; the Chicago school),
as in the neo-institutionalist approach (Williamson, 1985), this school mistakenly identifies
law as an external constraint involving prohibitions and costs that actors seek to minimize.
Not only does this approach not take into account the presence of non-instrumentalist types
of rationality, but the notion of incomplete contract makes this approach vulnerable. First,
with regard to economic theory, if contracts were ‘complete’ the situation of static equili-
brium would make markets impossible. Second, from the perspective of jurists and Webe-
rian sociology, the notion of incomplete contract overlooks the fact that, like all legal rules,
contracts define not so much prohibitions as frameworks for economic action within which
actors form their expectations and define their strategies. From this perspective, civil or
commercial law textbooks present a much different notion of ‘quality’ than economists do.
The substantial qualities of a thing are among the elements for perfecting contracts. They
refer on the one hand to the use of the thing serves, and, on the other, to the will of the
contracting party. The problem is that textbooks and legal studies tend to overlook the fact
that the notion of ‘substantial quality’, as well as its applications to the various products
concerned by contracts, change over time, creating considerable tension.
This is where the study of legal history helps, shedding light on the evolution of legal
notions since the early modern times that originated in the Renaissance (Halpérin, 1996;
Hilaire, 1986, 1995; Poughon, 1987; Torre-Schaub, 2002; Tuffery, 1998). In the mid-
nineteenth century, the legal meaning of exchange was not the same as under the Ancien
Régime, not only because exchange had lost its privileged place in economic thought, but
also because the corresponding legal notion had changed. In fact, the break occurred not so
much in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as a century earlier. Up until the
34 The ‘free law’school, from Eugène Ehrlich to François Gény, elaborated on this opposition, that is still present
in Georges Gurvitch’s work.
early seventeenth century, the relevant legal notion was the one inherited from Roman and
medieval law, sunallagma, where exchange is not entirely distinct from gift. It was only
after that sales contracts were distinguished from exchanges strictly speaking (Poughon,
1987). According to Poughon, exchange was the essential qualifying notion of the contract.
But ‘even at the very moment when commutative justice triumphed, municipal authorities
were still rendering distributive justice in commercial relations between salers and consu-
mers; this justice was based not on parties equality but on contract equity.’ This was neces-
sary to ensure a just price and stop all speculation; the requirement of good faith was condu-
cive to parties’ mutual trust and implied transaction transparency. Hence the presence of
the state: buyer was no longer alone in facing seller (Tuffery, 1998).
It is significant that, chronologically, at just the moment when exchange was taking on
importance in economic analysis, it lost all its interest for jurists, who preferred the notion
of contract. The opposition between sale and exchange in the eighteenth century reflected
the existence of two conceptions of contract. In one, the contract existed as soon as there
was consent of the two parties; in the other, material performance was required. This ambi-
valence is reproduced in the French Code Civil. The first outline for the Code exhibits
confusion between sale and exchange, with exchange considered as a double sale. The
definitive version dispels the ambiguity: exchange is subordinate to sale.
6.4. Historians’ idea of quality
Still, historians took a long time to recognize the interest of historical study of the law.
Their tendency, especially in economic history, was to reproduce economists’ approaches.
They neglected product quality, or took one or another definition of it as simply given.
Above all, many historians accepted the idea that prices correctly reflected quality and that
corporative quality control as practiced under the Ancien Régime had only thrown off the
play of the market and thereby limited growth. Several historians, namely those interested
in how cities were supplied (Braudel, 1973; Kaplan, 1996; Labrousse, 1933; Meuvret, 1988)
were concerned with product ‘qualities.’ In general, however, this meant either identifying
reliable statistical sources or studying the problems that product quality raised for munici-
pal authorities when working to implemented their policies. The socio-economic and ins-
titutional construction of quality was not a focus of research. Neither construction of legal
rules or their application in legal disputes were part of it.
Recent studies show however that quality definition was part of how the economy under
the Ancien Régime functioned, and that these arrangements can be distinguished from a
market economy, though it is important to specify that quality innovation and development
were present (Grenier, 1996; Hilaire-Perez, 2000; Hirsch, 1992; Kaplan, 2001; Minard,
1997; Reynard, 2000). These analyses, which use innovative approaches to the history of
economic thought, have identified what was specific in Ancien Régime economic catego-
ries and practices (Perrot, 1994). Unfortunately, these approaches are almost completely
neglected by food historians who did not provide convincing explanations for the introduc-
tion of new products and the development of the existing ones. Fernand Braudel and his
followers, pay no attention to the way a product is defined and to the institutional construc-
tion of its quality. It is assumed that everyone knew and shared the same notion of ‘coffee,’
‘wheat,’ ‘sugar,’ whereas this was not always the case. And the phenomenon is not only
relevant for new products: the wheat police under the Ancien Régime put into evidence that
institutional classification was part of quality definition. John Brewer and Roy Porter’s
work (Brewer, Porter, 1993) on the history of consumption has the same limitation. When
the authors write of the ‘consumption revolution,’ they assume that the products in
question—tea, sugar, wine—were homogeneous and that everybody defined them in the
same way and attributed the same characteristics to them. This is why these studies have
trouble getting free of diffusionist or epidemiological models for the spread of new products.
Martin Bruegel (1999, 2000) indicated a possible way out of this impasse when he brou-
ght to light the role in diffusing new products of such institutions as schools, hospitals, and
especially the army. The diffusion of canned foods occurred in France after long consumer
reluctance, in part through schools but above all through the army, particularly after World
War I. The works in progress of a number of young French researchers likewise look into
the historical construction of quality, for example in the nineteenth-century markets for
meat and food staples in France and Europe from 1960 (Lhuissier, 2002; Piet, 2002).
6.5. Toward an economic and legal history
Is is possible to get beyond such limits?Yes, by simultaneously paying attention to norm
production and their application (legal, judicial, as related to productive technology, etc.)
and to their links with economic behaviour. All these concerns are to be put into a historical
economic dynamic. Since economic actors do not act in a perfect information system, uncer-
tainty is structural; but their subjective perceptions also count in their decision-making.
They may but they also may not share quality conventions, and this means that how such
conventions are established, transmitted and modified must also be explained. Law, concei-
ved less as a body of doctrine than a set of practices that affect actors’ anticipations and
behaviour, must be given a central place. Types of coordination among economic actors
(price, quality, information, norms) thus become inseparable from the hierarchies that under-
pin them. Analysis of legal disputes enables to understand how economic and institutional
actors perceive rules and put them into practice, and thereby to get beyond the traditional
opposition between market and norm (and institutions in general) and show that a market
economy in reality encompasses both these components. Product quality is a construction
situated at the intersection of economic action, technical innovation, judicial practices, scien-
tific knowledge, and political debate. From this perspective, falsification and fraud are not
pathological states, but partake of the very functioning of a market economy, based on both
economic action and legal rule. It then becomes possible to define the market economy as
an economics of quality and an economics of uncertainty in which norms and their activa-
tion cannot be fully distinguished from the economic action itself.
6.6. Litigation and economics of quality in context: the wine market in the nineteenth
century
The nineteenth-century wine market provides a good example of this approach (Stan-
ziani, 2003a, 2003b). From 1850 to1870 the wine market expanded; emphasis was above
all on quantity. In this context, actor uncertainty primarily concerned resources and com-
petition strategies and did not extend to economic environment (rules of the game, types of
rationality, quality definition, techniques). During the last quarter of the nineteenth century
the opposite situation occurred: actors shared neither product definitions or strategies, due
to several interrelated phenomena: the rise of an international market and the development
of transportation; new balances among French regions and within regions; urbanization
and increased social mobility; new techniques, namely organic chemistry being brought to
bear on agro-food business; other actors’ unknown strategies. All these phenomena gave
rise to radical uncertainty and brought about the breakdown of quality conventions. At this
point, several economic actors began crying ‘fraud’and ‘falsification’—by which they meant
that other actors were no longer playing by the rules. The fact is that existing norms and the
way they were being applied were no help at all. Notions of fraud, falsification, and product
‘quality’ as conceived in the penal code and law of 1851 were at a loss now that chemistry
was operative in the agro-food industry. Throughout the 1880s, the courts handed down
different rulings in food falsification cases. Magistrates’ uncertainty was twofold: scientific
uncertainty about whether the substances at issue were harmful (substances had to be pro-
ved either harmful or unharmful for judges to know what legal rule applied) and the absence
of legal traceability, since there were no accounting rules, which made it extremely difficult
to attribute responsibility to litigious parties.
Economic actors hostile to this situation set out to refine the information at their disposal
and modify the existing norms. These objectives could not be easily reached, since the
different winemakers and their associations did not share the same representation of the
market and they did not necessarily aimed to minimize transaction costs. A very similar
phenomenon conditioned public policy: All public administrations and civil servants did
not share a common representation of the market either, nor, by the same token, of the
state’s role. Some favoured fiscal measures for disciplining the market; some others sup-
ported forceful intervention in the economy to correct ‘market imperfections,’ though they
did not question the market itself. Among the latter camp, some gave priority to the ‘loyalty
of affairs’ and others to ‘consumers’ health.’ In other words, the state was doubly fragmen-
ted, horizontally between bureaus and departments and vertically within hierarchical levels.
The solution reached can be understood by stressing that, in contrast to what neo-
institutionalist game theory and the standard law and economics suggest, economic actors
do not conceive of legal rules as a constraint but rather as a field of action in which to
develop their expectations. Over the 1890s, several of the actors who had protested the
loudest against fraud preferred to give up imposing the norm which best deserves their own
interests, demanding instead only stable, clear norms that would enable them to develop
expectations and determine their strategies. Ultimately this solution was equally accepted
by those who had been profiting from ‘heterodox’ strategies—from then on qualified as
fraud. In fact, generalized cheating had led to a decrease in business, both in the national
market and at the international scale. French production and producers as a whole came to
suffer a negative reputation. Thus, an increasing majority of economic actors came to the
conclusion that stable rules were what would make it possible to reach an institutional
definition of products and procedures. It was on this basis that expectations could be deve-
loped and new quality conventions put in place, and this attitude explains the adoption of
the first special laws on butter (1887) and wine (1889, 1891), which marginalized certain
production techniques and producers, in some cases even excluding them from the market.
The law of 1905 synthesized and generalized this process, opening the way for an ins-
titutional definition of main products that was precise enough to fix the rules of the game
and yet flexible enough to allow for competition. It should be remembered, however, that
this law was aimed not at protecting the consumer but disciplining competition. It makes
sense, then, that recourse to norms inspired primarily by the law of 1905 has not been
especially helpful in resolving recent food safety problems.
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